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ABSTRACT

In recent years there has been a shift in the devices that people use to do their
computing. Of particular import has been the movement in the computing landscape towards
mobile devices. As would be expected, the proliferation of mobile devices has led to an increase
in their being a target for malware. In addition to this change in the sphere of personal
computing devices there has, at the same time, been a shift of server side computation moving
towards the cloud. There has been another development worth noting, a dramatic increase in
the number of Electronic Medical Records (EMR) being created along with an increase in
individual’s usage of technology, including mobile devices, to access their EMR. Because of the
importance of keeping medical records secure due to Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and ethical concerns, security and limiting access are of the utmost
importance. We implemented and tested a system herein to establish a connection between
mobile devices and cloud services that is secure, usable and limits access to appropriate parties.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The computing landscape is shifting toward mobile platforms with an increased number
of smart devices used as the preferred method of computing as compared to traditional
devices. Along with this shift, there has been a proliferation of healthcare and well-being
applications running on these smart devices. Thousands of these types of applications exist on
both of the leading app stores, namely Apple’s App Store and Google’s Google Play. [1] These
thousands of applications represent millions of downloads to smart devices. [2] Smart devices
used for health and well-being applications are likely targets of cyber-attacks which
compromise the privacy of device users. The push towards Electronic Health Records (EHR), the
digitization of health records, can lead to large scale data breaches of medical information. [3]
Use of EHR includes both ethical and legal responsibilities because of Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) and requires special care. Therefore, smart devices
using healthcare applications need to provide authorized access, and protect health data in
transit and at rest against various threat models such as sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks.

Statement of the Problem
Because of the increasing security risk in mobile devices, coupled with healthcare
increasingly using mobile devices to provide healthcare solutions, known as mHealth, via smart
1

devices there is a real and legitimate concern that a mobile device user’s information could be
susceptible to loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Since healthcare applications have
become a growing market there is additional concern to developers concerning the strict HIPAA
regulations outlining exactly how care must be taken of a patient’s data. Finally, because of
these regulations data must be kept secure from endpoint to endpoint, from mobile device to
server, whether it is cloud-based or not.

Objectives of the Study
In this study we hope to implement a secured system with the purpose of allowing a
mobile device to transmit healthcare-related information. This system will be created with the
direct goal of creating a secured channel that the data may be sent through that is robust
against many types of network attacks. In addition the system will be able to authenticate the
three players involved in a data transaction, namely, the cloud server, mobile device, and the
device user. The mobile device’s user will also be granted access to records that they have a
right to access or modify based on access control roles which are setup using an open-source
EMR server backend. The system will be tested for both performance and security. The scope of
the study will be primarily tied to implementing and testing the application on an Androidbased mobile device. The application will connect to a virtual machine running on Amazon Web
Services (AWS). While the system will be a proof of concept it will be limited to that and does
not have an intended purpose as a production level application.
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Significance of the Study
Mobile-to-cloud applications offer a unique opportunity for the healthcare industry.
Modern smart phones are a powerhouse of sensors and connectivity. A smart phone may
contain any number of sensors, including accelerometers, gyroscopes, rotation vector sensors,
linear acceleration sensors, gravity sensors. These may be either hardware or software based.
In addition smart phones have many methods of wireless communication including Wi-Fi, third
generation (3G), long term evolution (LTE), Bluetooth and near field communication (NFC). This
combination of sensors and connectivity make mobile devices ideally suited for use in mHealth
including self-care and remote-monitoring.
The study has the potential to demonstrate a working system that could be implemented in a
real-world mHealth application used to send and retrieve patient data in HIPAA-compliant and
secured manner. As mHealth applications continue to increase in number, the importance of
creating a model by which to secure the applications becomes increasingly important so that a
user’s healthcare data is not compromised.

Trends in Computing
Consistent trends in computing have been noticed in the past few years including a
move away from traditional platforms such as desktop and notebook computing. Along with
this decline, mobile devices have seen a surge in popularity. Along with that surge, threats to
those mobile devices via malware have been increasing. Finally, cloud computing is on the rise
throughout all segments of computing; personal, private sector, government, and academic.
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Changes in Consumers’ Device Preference
In the past few years the landscape of computing has seen a coming paradigm shift in
the manner of devices consumers are choosing to purchase. There has been an increasing
movement to mobile devices from more traditional devices such as the desktop PC. In 2013,
968 million smartphones and 195 million tablets were sold. That represents a 46% year to year
increase with 2012 sales at 796 million units of smart devices in total. Of that increase in sales
of smart devices, tablets saw the largest growth year to year. With sales of 116 million in 2012,
tablets increased by 68% reaching 195 million units sold throughout 2013. [4] [5]
This increase in smart device sales is contrasted by declining sales in the traditional PC
market, including desktop PCs and notebooks. In 2013 traditional PCs had declining sales, with a
decrease in units from 341 million in 2012 to 299 million units in 2013, a 12.3% decline. [6]

Mobile Threats on the Rise
As would be expected, the rise in the popularity of mobile devices has led them to be
more popular targets for malware attacks. During the first half of 2013 more than 51,000 new
mobile malware threats were discovered, and were responsible for infecting approximately 21
million devices. [7] On the Android OS platform as of the second quarter of 2013 more than
718,000 malicious and high risk mobile applications exist. [8] This represents a doubling of the
number of malicious applications compared to the beginning of 2013. More importantly it took
three years for the number of malicious applications to reach the level found at the beginning
of 2013. [8] This is especially important when considering that in 2013, Android devices
garnered approximately 78% of the smart phone market and 62% of the tablet market. [4] [5]
4

The Android-based smart devices provide fragmentation that malware developers
exploit. That is to say, the burgeoning creation of different Android devices running different
versions of the operating system has led to a multitude of different operating system versions
that must be protected against threats. That fragmentation, coupled with only four percent of
Android smart device users running the latest version of Android as of June 3, 2013, provides an
incredibly broad target at which malware developers may take aim. [9] This is a problem that
will continually exist within any fragmented operating system, and with the addition of devices
on the market that cannot be updated except by a mobile carrier, users are unable to update
their devices to the current version. Table 1.1 shows the overall fragmentation of the Android
operating system as of September 9th, 2014.

Table 1.1: Android Operating System Fragmentation

[10]
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Increasing Popularity of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is becoming more prevalent. Cloud computing can be defined as:
“a type of parallel and distributed system consisting of a collection
of inter-connected and virtualized computers that are dynamically
provisioned and presented as one or more unified computing
resource(s) based on service-level agreements established
through negotiation between the service provider and
consumers.” [11]

Cloud computing is a service to customers via either infrastructure as a service (IaaS) or
platform as a service (PaaS). These two methodologies are similar but distinctly different from
one another. In the IaaS paradigm, the vendor manages the infrastructure that the customer
uses. The infrastructure includes the “network, storage, compute resources and virtualization
technology.” [12] PaaS encompasses all of what IaaS offers, but with the addition of an
application development platform. This can include “operating systems, databases, middleware
and up-to-date tools and services.” [12] There are three main categories in which IaaS cloud
computing falls based upon a customer’s need, namely hosting of a single application or group
of related applications, a virtual data center (VDC), or batch processing. [13]
Cloud-based IT systems are becoming increasingly prevalent in broad sectors of
industry. CompTIA, the non-profit trade association whose goal it is to advance the interests of
information technology (IT) professionals, released their 4th Annual Trends in Cloud Computing
report in September, 2013. While year over year from 2012 there is still the same approximate
percentage of companies not using cloud-based solutions, of the 90% that are using cloudbased strategies there has been a marked increase in what portion of their IT portfolio uses a
cloud solution. [14]
6

Trends in Healthcare
While there have been changes in the landscape of computing, the healthcare industry
has been going through changes of its own. This is in no small part due to changes in
computing. One of the most prevalent changes in healthcare recently is the move towards EHR
as the prevalent form of maintaining records in the healthcare industry. Because of the design
of EHRs being able to be accessed and viewed by multiple parties, it is important to consider
that these records will need some sort of mechanism to control which individuals are allowed
to access, read, and write to specific files or information. In addition the concept of the EHR
was created so that they could be used meaningfully as defined by three concepts explicitly
stated in the Stage 1 definition of EHRs:


“Complete and accurate information. With electronic health records, providers
have the information they need to provide the best possible care. Providers will
know more about their patients and their health history before they walk into
the examination room.



Better access to information. Electronic health records facilitate greater access
to the information providers need to diagnose health problems earlier and
improve the health outcomes of their patients. Electronic health records also
allow information to be shared more easily among doctors' offices, hospitals,
and across health systems, leading to better coordination of care.



Patient empowerment. Electronic health records will help empower patients to
take a more active role in their health and in the health of their families.
Patients can receive electronic copies of their medical records and share their
health information securely over the Internet with their families.” [15]

The third portion of the Stage 1 meaningful use definition, namely patient
empowerment, is especially important when considering the use of a mobile device. A mobile
device can be used to empower a patient medically in a couple of different ways. Self-care is
increasingly important in an individual’s attempt to meet their healthcare goals. mHealth is a
7

popular way for individuals to perform self-care. The Pew Research Center’s Mobile Health
2012 report found that 31% of adult cell phone owners in the U.S. use their phone to look up
health or medical information. Considering that 85% of U.S. adults own a cell phone, this
represents approximately 26% of all U.S. adults who use a cell phone for mHealth purposes.
This is an increase from approximately 14% in a study done in 2010. [16] The report also states
that one in five of the 45% of U.S. adults who own a smart phone have installed at least one
healthcare application. In addition to self-care, remote patient monitoring is on the rise.
Remote patient monitoring can be accomplished through many venues, e.g. specialized devices,
mobile devices, etc. In 2012 the market for remote patient monitoring was estimated to be
valued at $104.5 million. By 2019 it is forecasted that the market will reach a value of $296.5
million. Much of this increase is due to the increase of chronic diseases such as diabetes, whose
prevalence is expected to reach 29.6% in the U.S. by 2030. [17]
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
Our system, the mHealth Secure Portal, uses some previously developed functionality
such as work in visual password systems, as well as work in securing mHealth systems. Much
work has been completed in the fields of cryptography and encryption, and while very broad
and deep research areas, some aspects are particular to this system.

Visual Password System
One of the most important aspects of the mHealth Secure Portal is the visual password
system. Visual passwords offer benefits over standard textual based passwords. Visual
passwords function by having the user select the images that make up their password in lieu of
the keyboard characters that make up a text-based password. By mapping an image to
numerical value, one can increase the numerical probability that a password will be much
harder to determine programmatically. [18] [19] [20] [21] The use of visual passwords force the
user to use a stronger password than a traditional text-based password. There is an added
benefit in that a user cannot write down a visual password, further strengthening the
authentication provided by a visual password system. [20] In addition to adding increased
security visual password systems can be easier for a user to engage with since images are easier
9

to remember than strings of characters. [22] [23] There can be, however, a larger potential for
shoulder surfing attacks of these types of visual password systems depending on
implementation. [23]
A study done at the University of Alabama performed in 2004 has shown that after a
week of use there were fewer failed log in attempts using a visual password system than with a
password and PIN-based system. In addition, the study noted that a visual password system can
be easier to use as the keyboards on small handheld devices can lead to miskeyed values being
entered in a password-based system. [23] Another study done at Carleton University in Ottawa
showed that users of a visual password system had login accuracy rates of 96%. [18] Further, as
a comparison of visual passwords versus textual passwords, researchers at the University of
California Berkeley found that participants in a study had a 90% rate of success in completing
authentication with a visual-based system in comparison with approximately 70% success when
using passwords and PINs. [20]

Securing Healthcare Information
Since there is an aging population in the U.S., and because there has been a burgeoning
of the mobile device market, it is natural that there has been abundant research done in the
securing of healthcare systems that are based around mobile devices. In addition, this research
is important because there are real ethical, as well as legal ramifications when these types of
mHealth systems are put into practice. Another important aspect of any mHealth system is that
it offers the ability of healthcare providers to be more efficient with their time. [24] [25] [26]
[27]
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One of the basic aspects of HIPAA compliance deals with securing a patient’s healthcare
information. Therefore a system that transfers this type of information must be robust in terms
of being secure. Researchers at National Chung Hsing University came up with a novel approach
using a password on a mobile device along with a smart card. This type of approach is
interesting in that it provides a form of two-factor authentication. [25] Researchers at
Velammal Engineering College in Chennai, India have proposed a system that incorporates
access control. [24] This is an important aspect of any HIPAA compliant system, as it is stated
that access control restrictions must be put in place. The researchers from Chennai focused on
aspects of authentication and encryption as well. Finally, a system was proposed by a group
from the University of Oslo. As with the system with the Chinese University, this system uses a
two-factor authentication mechanism along with encryption. [26]
There are many different encryption methods and techniques. There have however
been a couple of studies that look directly at our concerns. [28] [29] The mHealth Secure Portal
is concerned with two spheres, cloud computing and wireless networks. Researchers at
Menoufia University in Egypt have performed testing on known and popular modern
encryption techniques. Their findings show that AES encryption, our proposed encryption
method for EHR data, is suitable specifically for use within a cloud-based server, and even more
specifically using an Amazon Web Services Elastic Compute Cloud instance. [28] An analysis of
public key cryptography gives insight into our particular use case. The analysis was done on
public key cryptography in wireless sensor networks. The results of the work completed by
Menoufia University show that public key cryptography, especially RSA techniques, may not be
suitable for wireless sensor networks because of the time and energy costs associated. [29]
11

However, smart phones possess much more processing power than a wireless sensor node and
so may be practical for our particular application.

Summary
There is a strong indicator that a visual password system may have the benefit of
increased security and ease of use that textual passwords just can’t emulate. The mHealth
Secure Portal incorporates the use of a visual password system to take advantage of the added
security and usability. Mobile healthcare is a field that has many nuances. Authentication
techniques are varied, and while some provide better solutions than others, there is no solution
yet that can be considered one-size-fits-all. Smart cards as two-factor authentication along with
a standard text-based password is a good methodology, however it does not deal with the
possibility of a loss of a device, which could include the loss of the two-factor authentication
token. Many types of encryption have been used in the mobile sphere. Research shows that
current best practice is strong, and resilient against attacks. In the following sections our novel
approach will be discussed and the benefits of our system will be shown.
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CHAPTER III
A NOVEL APPROACH TO PROTECTING MOBILE HEALTHCARE APPLICATIONS IN MOBILE CLOUD

Introduction
To provide a secure system that will meet HIPAA regulations, users’ data must be kept
secure. To accomplish this, the devices involved and the user must be authenticated, and data
must be kept encrypted to assure that it cannot be viewed by potential attackers. Further,
access to data must be given only when the user requesting the data has rights to it. There are
multiple threat models that must be overcome to achieve this. Through the use of
public/private key pairs combined with a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, the mobile device
and server will be authenticated and a secure, encrypted channel will be created. Following
this, the user will authenticate using a visual password system. To prevent the viewing of data
by those without rights, an access control mechanism will be put in place on the server side.
Data can then be sent between the server and mobile device in a secure manner. Figure 3.1
shows a sequence diagram for the mHealth Secure Portal. To ensure that the mHealth Secure
Portal functions as intended, testing will be performed on the application.

13

Figure 3.1: mHealth Secure Portal Sequence Diagram

Secure Channel
Communications between the mobile device and server must be kept secure to
meet HIPAA requirements and to keep a user’s EHR secured. To accomplish this, we need a
shared secret that can be used between the mobile device and cloud server when they first
contact each other. The dangerous part about the first connection between the two actors is
that it is on an insecure channel. A DH key exchange is used as a means of exchanging keys to
14

calculate a shared secret. RSA asymmetric encryption is blended with a DH key exchange to
prevent this type of attack. Figure 3.2 shows a sequence diagram that represents our secure
channel and authentication protocol.

Figure 3.2: Secure Channel and Authentication Protocol Sequence Diagram
15

The protocol has multiple steps involved in creating this secure channel while also
authenticating the mobile device and the cloud server. After a mobile device opens a socket
with the listening server, the server responds with its public portion of the DH exchange,
𝑔 𝑦 mod 𝑝, which is calculated with its secret y. The mobile device takes this value, raises it to
the power of its secret x, and uses the resulting value to calculate K, a symmetric
encryption/decryption key created using the advanced encryption standard (AES). The mobile
device then signs the server’s public DH value with its private key after which it encrypts the
resulting value with K. This is then sent to the cloud server along with the mobile device’s public
portion of the DH exchange, 𝑔 𝑥 mod 𝑝, which has been calculated with the mobile device’s
secret, x. After the server receives this information from the mobile device it can calculate the
symmetric encryption/decryption key K by using AES on the value resulting from raising the
mobile device’s public portion of the DH exchange to it secret y. After the server has calculated
K is can use the key to decrypt what was sent from the mobile device. The decrypted value is
the server’s public portion of the DH exchange signed with the private RSA key of the mobile
device. By using the public RSA key of the mobile device to decrypt this, the server should be
able to then compare its public portion of the DH exchange with the resulting value. If the two
values match, the server knows two things: the encryption/decryption key K which can be used
for secure channel communication, and it knows that the mobile device is indeed who it says it
is and so is authenticated. If however the values do not match, it can then be assumed that an
impostor was contacting the server and hence the connection is dropped.
Assuming the values did however match, the server signs the mobile device’s public
portion of the DH exchange with the server’s private RSA key, and encrypts that data with the
16

symmetric encryption/decryption key K and sends this to the mobile device. The mobile device
uses encryption/decryption key K to decrypt the data received, after which it uses the server’s
public RSA key to decrypt the result from the previous step. If the final result of this matches
the mobile device’s public portion of the DH exchange, then the mobile device now knows that
the server is who it says it is and hence has been authenticated, and also has the symmetric
encryption/decryption key K, which be used for secure channel communication. If the two
values do not match, then the mobile device knows there is a malicious user on the other end
impersonating the cloud server and so closes the socket, terminating communication.
If everything matches, both devices have been authenticated. In addition there is a
one-time symmetric encryption/decryption key K, that can be used only during this session.
This provides a means for the two authenticated devices to communicate on an encrypted,
secure channel. It is important to note that both the server and the mobile device must have
knowledge of the other’s public key. As with any public/private key system, if the private key of
either has been compromised, impersonation can occur by an attacker. Once the mobile device
and cloud server have been authenticated and a secure channel setup for communication, then
a human user can enter their password.

Authentication
One of the key pieces to the system’s design is the ability for actors using the system to
authenticate themselves. In this case the actors include the mobile device user, the mobile
device, and the cloud server. It is important that all three actors are authenticated for each
session to prevent various threats against the system’s integrity and so that in the case of
17

multiple users using a single mobile device, only the appropriate data would be shown to them
based on their access level. These threats will be discussed in detail in the Threat Models
section later in the study. The actors will be authenticated in different manners depending on
their role.
For authenticating the mobile device and the virtual server asymmetric cryptography
is used. This is accomplished through the use of public/private key pairs that are created using
the RSA algorithm. This algorithm is a three part process: key creation, encryption, and
decryption. RSA creates two keys, one that is public and one that is private. This portion of the
system is actually implemented in concert with the creation of the secure channel, which
discussed in the previous section. Figure 3.2 shows in detail how RSA is used to authenticate
the mobile device and server, while at the same time creating a secure channel by performing a
DH key exchange.
One of the pieces for authenticating the human user of the mobile device is a visual
password. The user is actually the last actor in the process to be authenticated so that the
password is not sent out on the network before a secure channel has been created. By doing
this, a network sniffing attack is prevented from sniffing the human user’s visual password.
Visual passwords have an advantage in that they may be easier to remember than a traditional
text password. This has an additional benefit as well for use in a mHealth application. If the user
happens to be a stroke or dementia patient, then pictures of known people, places, or things
may be easier to recall than a similarly strong textual password. The images in the password are
mapped to values in the range of 1-255 which gives an image password much more strength
than a textual password with the same number of characters as images.
18

The user is prompted to choose a certain number of images, in this setup, seven. Of
those seven chosen images only a certain percentage actually has to be correct. Under this
implementation five of seven is considered acceptable. This percentage is chosen in an effort to
make the system more usable. Certain misses are expected because it is often easy to press
imprecisely on a smart phone’s small screen. This fuzziness prevents the user from having to try
to enter the visual password multiple times. Figure 3.3 shows the visual password entry screen
that is presented to the user.

Figure 3.3: mHealth Secure Portal Password Entry Screen

Access Control
Access control is a very important aspect of the system. Depending on the user, they
may have certain restrictions on what data they can write to, or even read. An example of this
may be a user of the system that is an accountant of a physician’s clinic where a particular
patient visits. It would be reasonable to expect that the accountant would be privy to
19

information such as social security number, payments due, and other items of a financial
nature. However, it would be unreasonable for an accountant to have access to items of a
personal or medical nature, such as what medications a patient is taking, or their weight, et
cetera. We implement access control on the mobile device using predefined roles that are
present in OpenEMR.
“OpenEMR is a Free and Open Source electronic health records
and medical practice management application that can run on
Windows, Linux, Mac OS X, and many other platforms. OpenEMR
is ONC Complete Ambulatory EHR certified and is one of the most
popular open source electronic medical records in use today.”
[30]

OpenEMR was chosen because it was open source software, and free to use. The use
of OpenEMR eliminated the need to build an entire server backend that meets all of the
requirements of HIPAA regulation when one already existed. One of the nice features of
OpenEMR was that a user can be defined multiple roles, making it easier to segregate out
which users can access which data. Some of the features of OpenEMR of interest to this system
are:




Ability to Encrypt Patient Documents
Supports fine-grained per-user access controls
Remotely accessible from any modern web browser with a suitable
security certificate installed [31]

Android
For the mobile device, the Android operating system was chosen. As mentioned in the
introduction it controls the largest market segment currently, and has the largest potential for
reach into the mobile device market. In addition to its predominant market share, Android has
20

a robust and full featured development environment. A Java-based programming language is
used on Android as well, which makes the platform familiar for many developers. There is also a
simulator available for many different Android devices currently on the market, so that testing
on many different hardware platforms and operating system versions can be performed easily.
Eclipse is a popular integrated development environment (IDE), with plugins
available for the IDE including the Android Development Tools (ADT) plug-in. The ADT plugin for
the Eclipse IDE supports some aspects of Java and includes advanced features to ease
development, testing, and debugging of Android applications. [32] There are some advanced
features included with the plugin, including the ability develop on Android hardware, as well as
developing on virtual devices. On-device debugging is included as well. In addition, there are
GUI builders included to ease the development of user interfaces across multiple device types.

Amazon Web Services
AWS was chosen for the cloud server because of their high availability and low cost. A
virtual machine instance can be easily deployed through the use of a simple web GUI.
Additional features include the ability to create custom security groups for different servers by
setting port forwarding and firewalls rules that can be used across multiple virtual machine
instances. AWS also offers services such as storage solutions, load balancers, elastic
MapReduce, and elastic internet protocol (IP) addresses, which are essentially static IP address
for an entire account and not just a single instance. However for our system, we simply needed
IaaS and opted for a single Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instance of a virtual machine.
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Amazon Web Services’ Elastic Compute Cloud “is a web service that provides
resizable compute capacity in the cloud. It is designed to make web-scale computing easier for
developers.” [33] The elastic portion of EC2 refers to the ability of an instance to be rescaled on
a short timeframe, minutes. You can instantiate virtual cloud servers on a large scale as
mentioned in the introduction.

Testing
As stated earlier, this work is an extension of previous work. However there was no
verification that the system performed as it was intended. The fuzzy password implementation
is a new addition to the overall system. Some of the work accomplished was testing of the
entire system. The two key aspects of the system are usability and security. There are many
different measures of usability. For this experiment, we focused on performance of the
encryption, decryption, and secure channel creation. These were chosen because lengthy
performance times for these operations could render the system of little use. Users expect
applications to function quickly with low response times and may abandon using them if the
application does not respond quickly enough. A white paper from Forrester Consulting shows
that eCommerce web applications have a 40% customer loss at a three second page load time.
[34] Penetration testing of the purported security of the mHealth Secure Portal is also of vital
importance. HIPAA compliance demands that the data is kept secure endpoint to endpoint. To
this end, testing of the security of the created secure channel will be completed.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND EVALUTION

Performance testing was performed on the mHealth Secure Portal by calculating AES
key creation times as well the amount of time required to encrypt and decrypt large amounts of
text. To calculate the AES session creation times, the system time was captured before and
after the start of the AES key creation using the Java currentTimeMillis() method of the System
class on both the mobile device and the server. Included in this timeframe was the time
required for the mobile device and server to create the shared key and any time delay in
communication between the two devices. An AES session key creation time of less than two
seconds was chosen as a success limit based on research done by Forrester Consulting. [34]
Similarly, the currentTimeMillis() method was used before and after encryption of large
amounts of text on the mobile device and before and after decryption time on the server. A
success limit of two seconds was once again used.
Penetration testing was performed by capturing data sent from the mobile device to the
server over a Wi-Fi connection by using a notebook computer in promiscuous mode. The
resulting Wi-Fi traffic packets were then analyzed using Wireshark to look for patterns in the
data that was sent to determine if a frequency analysis attack could be performed to determine
the contents of the encrypted packets. In addition, using the same captured packets, a replay
attack was attempted by sending the captured packets from a device that had not
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authenticated with the server. The results from these test can be seen in the final two sections
of this chapter.

Hardware
The hardware in the system consists of two parts, a mobile device, and a cloud server.
Amazon Web Services was chosen as the cloud server provider using a low-cost t1 micro
instance. An Android device was chosen as the mobile device, a 2013 Google Nexus 7. The
mobile device was using the second most up to date version of Android available, Android 4.3
Jelly Bean.

Authentication
The authentication protocol used for this experiment is described in Figure 3.4. The
mobile device and server are first authenticated while creating a secure channel. The results of
a successful DH key exchange are shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: mHealth Secure Portal DH Key Exchange and Creation of Secure Channel

After the devices have been authenticated, and the secure channel encryption key has
been created, users are then able to authenticate themselves. By using this methodology the
user password may be passed without the risk of the password being passed unencrypted. The
password system used was a visual password system using a grid of 255 different thumbnail
images.
Each user has a seven image password. While this may seem like a small password
length it should be noted that each of the images is mapped to a value from 1-255. This allows
for a password combination number equal to 2557, or 7 × 1016. Note that a modern day
password containing uppercase characters, lowercase characters, digits, and special characters
would have a total of 94 characters from which to choose. This yields a total password
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combination number equal to 947, or 6.48 × 1013, three orders of magnitude smaller number of
combinations.
Some implementation on the fuzzy password system was previously done. In this
project, we completed implementation of a fuzzy password system. The fuzzy password system
allows a user to misclick up to two of the seven picture inputs. The password inputs are still
position dependent. If a user had a password that mapped to the values {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, then
a password that mapped to {1, 1, 3, 3, 5, 6, 7} would pass while a password that mapped to {7,
6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1} would fail. The original project this work was derived from had a faulty password
system. The password checking allowed for erroneous passwords to be entered. For example, if
a user had a password consisting of the 1st image repeated seven times, the password would
map to the value {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}. However, to get a password match, a user could enter the
11th image seven times that would result in an incorrect password acceptance of {11, 11, 11,
11, 11, 11, 11}. This was corrected in the current implementation.
Each of the images had a value based on its position in the grid of images and so the
images chosen by the user are mapped to their numerical values. These numerical values are
converted to a byte array and encrypted using our AES key that will be discussed in the next
section. The password is then sent to the server whereupon it is decrypted and compared
against the password value tied to the user who attempted to login.
If the user successfully matched the password, then the user had access to the data
allowed them according to their access level which is determined by the setting for that user
stored in OpenEMR. This access can range from seeing a list of all users’ usernames, seeing a list
of patients and information about them, or even allowing a data upload. To prevent one of the
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more common unsophisticated attacks, the brute force attack, if the passwords do not match
the user is bumped back to the secure channel creation page. A brute force attack is performed
by running all possible password combinations known until the proper password is entered,
garnering the attacker access to the system. For an attacker to attempt this type of an attack
would take an exceedingly long time since a DH key exchange would need to be performed for
each iteration of password entry.
This authentication system is fairly robust as implemented. It is able to prevent a few
different types of attacks. The aforementioned brute force attack would be thwarted. In
addition the authentication method prevents, to some degree, all of the threat models
mentioned earlier, namely sniffing, MITM, loss of device, and impersonation. Sniffing of the
traffic would yield the attacker little information since anything sent over the communication
network before encryption still requires knowledge of the both the mobile device and the cloud
server’s private RSA keys. A MITM attack is prevented for the same reason of needing private
key information about both devices. A loss of device would not be a hardship because of the
number of password combinations possible. Finally impersonation would fail even if an attacker
had private key information for the mobile device as the password would still be required for
system entry. However it should be noted that if the server’s private key information were
known to an attacker then the entire system would be compromised since that would mean an
attacker could enter the server through other means.
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Encryption
The Bouncy Castle encryption provider was used for our actual encryption, provides a
cryptographic application programming interface (API) for the Java and C# programming
languages.
The encryption process begins with the DH key exchange. Public/private RSA keys are
used to sign the pieces of the exchange in the DH protocol to prevent MITM attacks. The public
RSA keys of the devices must be known to each other. In our case the public key values were
hard coded into the system. After the DH key exchange has been performed the mobile device
and cloud server each have a value that is used to make a SHA-256 message digest that in turn
creates a 256 bit symmetric encryption/decryption AES key. The AES key can be seen in Figure
4.1 in the third text box from the top.
It is also important to note that this key is a one-time pad (OTP). The mobile device and
the cloud server only use this key for a single session. If a new session is requested, then a new
key must be created and should be distinct from any previous key that was created in a
previous session. This makes a replay attack impossible using an old session key. This session
key is then used for all other communications sent from either device to the other and allows
the user to login without worry of their password being compromised by an attacker that is
sniffing on the network. In addition, this encryption method prevents MITM attacks as the man
in the middle would not have the ability to determine the AES encryption key. In the case of a
lost device, no information about the human user is kept on the device so there is nothing to be
encrypted on the device itself.
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Access Control
The final piece of HIPAA requirement is that there is some sort of access control
mechanism in place to prevent someone from accessing data outside of what is allowed on a
user-by-user basis. OpenEMR is used as the primary source for access control. There are built-in
access levels that are used in the implementation. While the access levels could always become
more fine-grained, there are currently four access levels.
The first access level is that of an administrator. Administrators are given access to
information that would be pertinent to them, which consists of all of the data on the system
that does not contain healthcare records.
The next type of user is defined as a therapist. This user role would include physicians
and clinicians that work with patients. The therapist has access to a list of all of the patients
that are currently seeing them and their medical history. Therapists cannot see the medical
information of patients that are not associated with them.
The final non-patient type is an accountant. This type of user is denied access to medical
information about patients. They should however have information to billing records, missed
payments, etc. Currently, the accountant is allowed to view a list of patients that are associated
with the practice that the accountant works for.
The final access role is that of a patient. While a patient has a right to view all of the
records pertaining to them, both financial and medical. In addition to retrieval, the system is
currently designed to collect information from the patient remotely using sensors and mobile
devices.
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Usability
A key aspect of any application is its usability. At the beginning of the interaction a user
is presented with a screen that allows them to enter their username that has previously been
registered with the OpenEMR backend that is running on the cloud server. Figure 4.2 shows the
username entry screen. This is a simple interface and easy to understand. After entering a
username the user is presented with a page that will allow them to create a secure channel
between the mobile device and the cloud server. See Figure 4.1. This page would not be shown
to the user in a production application, however it is shown here for clarification purposes. In
practice, the secure channel creation and device authentication would take place between the
username entry screen and the password entry screen as shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 4.2: mHealth Secure Portal Username Entry Screen
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The most important aspect as far as usability goes for the system is the visual password
employed. Visual passwords can be easier to remember than a lengthy textual password of
similar security. This may be especially important if the person using the system happens to be
a dementia or stroke patient that has diminished mental capacity. If the user enters the wrong
password for the username they are bumped back to the secure channel creation page. To
make the system more usable however a reset button is included. This can be seen in Figure
3.1, a user is allowed to reset their attempt at entering the password. Currently as the user
enters their password, a numerical representation is shown to the user as can be seen in Figure
4.3. This would not be included in a production release of the application, but is shown here for
demonstration purposes.

Figure 4.3: mHealth Secure Portal Password Accepted
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Encryption and Decryption Performance
Results were gathered to see how well both of the devices performed as far as being
able to encrypt or decrypt data in a timely manner. To assure that prior data was not retained
in memory and skewing the actual results, the setup for the results included restarting the
server and the application itself. This problem was discovered during testing. It was noticed that
without restarting the device and the server result times did indeed lower with each successive
attempt. For testing purposes a text document with 65,536 characters was used. This is
equivalent to a 19-27 page document using Times New Roman and a 12 point font. The
variation in page size comes from the character used. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of 20
rounds of encrypting the document before sending it to the server. Note that all times listed are
strictly for the encryption of the data and do not include the time taken to transfer the
encrypted data to the server.

Number of Occurrences

Distribution of Encryption Time
4.5
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3.5
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2.5
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1
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3435363738394041424344454647484950515253545556575859
Time in Milliseconds

Figure 4.4: Distribution of Mobile Device Encryption Times
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The mean for all 20 runs was approximately 42 ms with a standard deviation of
approximately 8 milliseconds. More detailed information can be seen in Table 4.1

Table 4.1: Statistical Information on Mobile Device Encryption
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
-3σ
+3σ

41.77777778 ms
7.952473204 ms

34 ms
59 ms
25 ms
17.92035816 ms
65.63519739 ms

Decryption times were a little longer on average, but tighter grouping and hence a
smaller standard deviation. Decryption on the 64-bit AWS Ubuntu 12.04.3 LTS instance
averaged approximately 59 ms over the course of the 20 test runs. Figure 4.5 and Table 4.2
show the distribution and statistical information, respectively, for the decryption times from
testing.

33

Distribution of Decryption Time
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Cloud Server Decryption Times

Table 4.2: Statistical Information on Cloud Server Decryption
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
-3σ
+3σ

58.83333333 ms
2.74933147 ms

56 ms
67 ms
11 ms
50.58533892 ms
67.08132774 ms

Since the creation of the secure channel is such an integral part of this system, testing
was also done on how long creation of the AES session key took for each of the devices. While
AES key creation times on the Android device appear to be much slower than those of the cloud
server, it is important to remember that the protocol requires the server to calculate the AES
key first and then the information is passed along to the mobile device. Please reference Figure
3.2 for more information on details of the process. Figure 4.6 and Table 4.3 show distribution
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and statistical information for AES key creation time on the Android device. The mean time for
AES key creation was approximately 1.7 seconds.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of Mobile Device AES Key Creation Times

Table 4.3: Statistical Information on Mobile Device AES Key Creation Times
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
-3σ
+3σ

1704 ms
106.5965456 ms
1591 ms
1875 ms
284 ms
1384.210363 ms
2023.789637 ms

Finally, Figure 4.7 and Table 4.4 show the distribution and statistical information for
cloud server AES key creation times. Notice, that while the mean for the cloud server is less
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than a third the value of that from the mobile device, their ranges are very similar to each
other. This is most likely because the cryptographic library used on the mobile device is a
derivation of the one used on the cloud server, Spongy Castle and Bouncy Castle respectively.
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of Cloud Server AES Key Creation Times

Table 4.4: Statistical Information on Cloud Server AES Key Creation Times
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
-3σ
+3σ

420.5555556 ms
97.3907969 ms
326 ms
587 ms
261 ms
128.3831649 ms
712.7279462 ms

Overall, the results from the 20 runs of testing tend towards the positive. The proposed
two second time limit for all encryption, decryption, and AES key creation was met. While the
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mean for the AES key creation time for the mobile device was close to the two second limit, it
seems it is an acceptably fast system.

Penetration Testing
The application that was developed was designed to be secure, so penetration testing
was performed to ensure that the design was as secure as intended. There are many attack
vectors to consider when testing how securely and robustly the design performs. However,
some of the attack vectors are considered outside of the purview of this testing. For example,
the server that the mobile device connects with could be attacked using a distributed denial-ofservice attack (DDoS), whereby the server’s resources would be depleted by a large number of
connections being attempted at one time by a malicious user. Indeed, this sort of attack would
most likely be successful in preventing the mobile device from successfully connecting to the
server. However, this type of attack is more a concern in regards to the availability of the
system, whereas the primary concern of this particular system in regards to this study is the
confidentiality of data in regards to HIPAA compliance. There are however two important
attack methods that were attempted against the current application, namely packet analysis
and a replay attack. Both were attempted using packets that were passively sniffed while the
mobile device and cloud server were communicating throughout both the secure channel setup
and the transference off data from the mobile device to the cloud server.
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Packet Capture
For the purposes of this study the data was captured on a non-secured Wi-Fi network.
This was done for simplicity’s sake. To capture date on a secured Wi-Fi connection additional
setup would be needed. Namely, to capture traffic on a secured Wi-Fi network, an additional
attack would need to be performed since the data would have an additional encryption layer
because of the network, e.g. WPA2-PSK. The attack required is an ARP cache poisoning attack
and would need to be performed against both the network’s router and the target. Essentially
the attacker would perform a man in the middle attack whereby the router would talk to the
attacker thinking it was the victim, and the victim would talk to the attacker thinking it was the
router. In this way the traffic could be analyzed without the added layer of encryption provided
on the secured network. It is important to note that to perform an attack, or even capture the
data stream from the mobile device to the cloud server, over a cellular network is non-trivial
and currently not possible.
For the data capture that was performed, there were two required elements. The first is
a wireless network interface card capable of being placed in promiscuous and monitor mode.
The second was some sort of packet capture software. There are multiple options for both of
these requirements and two different of the software options were tested. For the hardware, a
2012 MacBook Pro was used. The wireless network interface card in the MacBook can be
placed in both promiscuous and monitor mode. For software the first option tested was the
built-in Wireless Diagnostics application which is a part of Apple’s OS X. Wireless Diagnostics
includes many useful utilities such as the ability to scan for Wi-Fi networks and display the
network’s bandwidth and channel. More importantly Wireless Diagnostics allows a user to
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capture network traffic by saving all of the 802.11 WLAN frames to a file with a .wcap
extension. The second option was to use the popular Wireshark packet sniffing software. When
using Wireshark, the wireless network interface card must be placed in monitor mode to
capture the traffic that was sent from the Nexus tablet. Wireshark saves the captured frames in
a .pcapng file format, which is the preferred file format. In addition, when capturing the live
traffic the frames can be viewed live. Since analysis of the packets is not possible using Wireless
Diagnostics, Wireshark was chosen for both packet capture and analysis. Figure 4.8 shows the
Wireshark interface during a live packet capture.

Figure 4.8: Live Packet Capture Using Wireshark
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Packet Analysis
One of the benefits of using Wireshark is the aforementioned ability to analyze the
captured information. Wireshark allows deep inspection of the packets and can filter out
unwanted packets using filters. It is not unreasonable to assume that an attacker attacking this
system would be able to identify the IP address of the cloud server by resolving the address
from the domain name where the OpenEMR portal can be reached. Once the IP address has
been obtained by the attacker the captured packets can be filtered by using one of three filters.
The first, ip.addr, will show all packets either being sent to or received from the IP address.
The second, ip.src will filter out all packets other than those that originated at the IP
address. Finally, ip.dst allows the viewing of only packets that were sent to the IP address.
Using these last two filters allows a more granular look at the traffic as far as determining what
was sent to or from the target server/IP address.
Once the packets were obtained from the communication between the mobile device
and the cloud server, the first step was to filter out the unwanted traffic using the method
above. The remaining packets’ payload was inspected, that is to say, the data portion of the
packet, and not the header information of the packet, was looked at using Wireshark. Both
plaintext data and encrypted data was sent between the server and client. The former was sent
strictly for informational purposes to be used in this study. Figure 4.9 shows a packet of
plaintext data being analyzed. The payload, or data, portion of the packet is highlighted. It is
important to note that in this figure the first character highlighted, w, is equivalent to the value
77 in raw data, which is the ASCII value for lowercase w. There are other w characters in the text
and they map to the appropriate raw data as well.
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Figure 4.9: Packet Payload in Plaintext

However when looking at packets that contain ciphertext instead of plaintext, the
results are obviously different. When correlating the position of the first letter w in the
plaintext in Figure 4.10 we can see that it maps to 77 in raw data. As well, the last character in
the third to last line is w and maps to 77 as well. However in Figure 4.10 we can see that the
ciphertext version of the same data is a period, as is the last character in the third to last line. It
is of note however that the raw data values are different, ba for the first character, and 91 for
the other. The periods don’t represent the actual value, but instead are replacement characters
used by Wireshark to denote values that are outside of the range of displayable, or even
legitimate ASCII characters. In this case ba and 91 in ASCII are both not legitimate characters.
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Figure 4.10: Packet Payload in Ciphertext

Knowing that many ciphers have a set block size, we can look at more ciphertexts to try
to discern any patterns. However it should be noted that some block ciphers use previous
blocks to alter the later blocks. There are benefits to this chaining of blocks, but also downsides.
If there is an error in transmission of a chained block, then all following blocks will not be able
to be decrypted. However chaining has the benefit of not having identical blocks of ciphertext
when using the same key on the same plaintext. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show repeating patterns
in plaintext and ciphertext respectively.

42

Figure 4.11: Repeating Pattern in Plaintext

Figure 4.12: Repeating Pattern in Ciphertext

Based on packets that have been examined so far, it is easy to see patterns in the
ciphertext. This tells us that a block cipher is indeed being used in the system. However, up to
this point it is still not possible to determine the block size of the encryption method. To get
even further into the inspection of the packets’ payload, a final set of plaintext and ciphertext is
examined. Figure 4.14 shows a ciphertext of a repeated ASCII character.

Figure 4.13: Smallest Repeating Pattern in Ciphertext
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Based on Figure 4.13, if an attacker captured ciphertext of a repeated string, which is
possible if not probable, they would be able to determine multiple things. Since each of the
characters on the left represent a hexadecimal value, which is 2^4 bits, and there are 32
hexadecimal characters in each repeated section, the attacker would know that the block size
of encryption being used is 128 bits, which is indicative of AES encryption. Furthermore, since a
block is being repeated in the ciphertext it is evident that the mode of AES encryption is
Electronic CodeBook (ECB).
The real question for this system then becomes, can an attacker glean any information
from sniffing packets with encrypted payload being sent between the cloud server and mobile
device? We know that the system is sending data between the mobile device and cloud server
as characters, and that each character is comprised of a single byte. Given this, the blocks being
sent are 16 text characters long. The image shown in Figure 4.14 is the Linux Tux mascot both
unencrypted and encrypted using AES in ECB mode. This combination is often used when
describing the shortfalls of ECB in reference to a frequency analysis attack as the image is still
discernible when encrypted. Our system is used primarily as a means to send mobile device
sensor data to the cloud server. It does, however, also send textual data to differing user roles.
With that in mind, for an attacker to decrypt sniffed traffic a frequency analysis would have to
be performed on blocks of ciphertext that are 16 characters long. Repeated language
characters are not analogous to the repeated information that is easy to perform a frequency
analysis on in Figure 4.14. Of particular import are the sections of pseudo-randomness that
occur in Figure 4.14. These sections are portions of the encrypted image that are not one of the
three main colors in the original image. While our system does send textual data that has been
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encrypted to some of the user roles, the volume sent needed to perform a frequency analysis,
along with the non-trivial nature of doing so on 16 character long blocks indicate that AES
encryption is ECB mode is adequate for our needs. In addition, the benefit of not having data
corrupted due to an error in a block of block chained ciphertext makes the use of ECB
worthwhile.

[35]
Figure 4.14: Frequency Analysis of Tux Encrypted Using AES in ECB Mode

Replay Attack
A replay attack is an attack that is accomplished by sending previously captured traffic
between two different actors. In our case the traffic that is retransmitted is the traffic that were
the original packets sent between the cloud server and mobile device used for setting up the
secure channel and for authenticating the actors, namely the cloud server, mobile device, and
the user of the mobile device. Having already captured all packets transmitted between the
server and client for the packet analysis, this attack required using a different portion of the
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packets than used previously. In our scenario, the attack consists of attempting to login to the
cloud server as a legitimate mobile device.
To transmit the packets from the attacking machine to the target machine two different
tools were used, primarily to verify the results. The first tool is tcpreplay, which is actually a
collection of command-line interface tools that allow the user to perform many actions. Of
particular interest is the ability to replay a captured set of packets contained in a .pcap file. The
second tool is bit-twist, another command-line interface tool that is an Ethernet packet
generator. Bit-twist allows a user to perform essentially the same function as tcpreplay, namely
the ability to generate Ethernet traffic from a previously captured network session.
The failure of this attack was succinct when attempted, hence the use of two different
tools. The cloud server would not create a new server thread. This behavior was expected, as
each session between a mobile device and the cloud server included a prime number created
from a pseudo-random number. Essentially this creates a nonce. As a nonce is only used for a
single cryptographic communication, any attempt to reuse the nonce fails. This is because the
nonce used was for the creation of the DH keys. Attempting to reuse the DH key results in a
non-matching DH key on the client and server sides.

46

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Objectives of the Study
This study sought to devise a method of creating a secure system for transmitting EHR,
which included three essential security elements: authentication, encryption, and access
control. These three criteria are essential in maintaining HIPAA compliance. The study also
required an actual implementation of the resulting protocol as well as testing to ensure that
data could indeed be sent securely in a timely manner.
The system design included a method of authenticating mobile devices and the cloud
servers with which they communicate. The system design also required a method of
authenticating users through a visual password system. The authentication methods had to be
resilient against a number of different threat models as well. Encryption was a primary goal of
this study. The data in a HIPAA-compliant application must keep all EHR data encrypted to
prevent loss of personal medical information of patients. Beyond authenticating all of the
actors involved in transactions, and encrypting all of the data, the application required the use
of access control. Depending on the user of the system, there is certain information that must
remain privileged depending upon the user’s role, e.g. an accountant should not have access
rights to a patient’s mental health history.
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Conclusions and Contributions
The protocol that was designed was successfully implemented to meet the objectives of
the study. Through the use of timing testing, it was shown that the encryption of data that is
sent between the mobile device and the cloud server was done in a timely manner as shown in
Chapter IV. In addition it was shown that creation time of the keys required to create and
ensure a secure channel between the server and mobile device was temporally acceptable. The
application showed to be robust against multiple attack vectors by testing of the encrypted
data that was sent between the mobile device and server after the secure channel was created.
This was done through passive packet sniffing and evaluation as would be done in a real attack
scenario.
The application that was developed to meet the protocol requirements was able to
successfully collect patient data in an unobtrusive manner. In addition to collecting patient
data, the application had to be able for medical staff to access information about their patients.
Administrative personnel could use the application to check any number of records relating to
the running of a medical practice. Accountants could use the application for tracking financial
information about medical practices they work for. In addition, the protocol had to be well
suited for use in a real world HIPAA-compliant medical application. There were a couple of
potential uses that can be envisioned for its use as a mHealth application in remote monitoring.
Stroke patients often have diminished motor skills. An application could developed that
would allow for a stroke patient to use a smart phone as a fall detection device. By using the
protocol devised, data collected from the sensors of the patient’s smart phone could be sent in
a secure and encrypted manner to a cloud server. Depending on the data sent to the cloud
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server, the patient’s physician could be notified of a potential fall the next time the physician
authenticates and connects to the secured system. This could reduce the amount of time a
patient is in pain. Another potential use is for patients with dementia. In some cases dementia
patients have a tendency to wander and get lost. With the bevy of chips and radios that a smart
device can access, such as GPS and Wi-Fi, it is trivial for a device to determine its location. A
predetermined geo-fence could be set up so that if a dementia patient were to breach its
perimeter then a notification could be sent to the cloud server backend. This could drastically
reduce the time to find a missing patient.

Recommendations for Further Study
While the objectives of the study were met, during development, many opportunities
for improvement were considered. Additional threats were noticed that the current system
does not mitigate. In lieu of the system’s need to remain HIPAA compliant, the findings have
broken down into the three sections needed to keep the system within regulation. Some of the
recommendations could be instituted in a minor upgrade to the current system. Others
however would lead to a fundamental change in how certain portions of the application have
been written.

Authentication
Authentication was a very important aspect of this study. If any of the actors in the
system were not who they say they were, then the entire system was a failure. While the visual
password currently being used was sufficient for authentication, it was still susceptible to
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shoulder surfing attacks. One of the reasons for this is that the same images were chosen each
time. This is compounded by the fact that the images were in the same position in the grid. One
option was to randomize the images location, and have associated metadata for each image
related to its mapped value the same no matter where it was in the grid. This however
presented a secondary problem in that the grid had 255 images. Trying to locate all seven of the
images would be a time consuming task for the user. A better option might be to use a method
similar to that used in Design and Evaluation of a Shoulder-Surfing Resistant Graphical
Password Scheme. This method is resilient to shoulder surfing attacks as the user is not actually
clicking on the images that comprise their password, but instead prove they know the secret by
clicking within the n-gon created by the location of the images. By using this method they prove
they know the secret without giving up the secret. This could be done in multiple iterations as
well, which would lead to a true fuzzy vault, zero-knowledge authentication system for the
user.
In addition to a different password system for authentication, it would be advantageous
to add some sort of logic to the server so that multiple login attempts were attempted
unsuccessfully after a DH exchange from the same mobile device. That type of activity could be
an indication that a device has been lost or stolen and an attacker is trying to brute force the
system. The owner of the device could be contacted automatically through email or other
means to determine if the device has been lost or stolen. Logic could also be added to block a
device based on their public key if the device has been known to be compromised.
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Encryption
Currently the encryption mechanism is fairly robust against threats. However there is
always room for improvement in cryptographic systems. Some of these improvements would
be simple enhancements to the current code. Others involve work on the server administration
side of things.
Currently the prime numbers for the DH key exchange are created programmatically
with a prime number generator seeded with a number from a pseudorandom number
generator. This could be improved by using sensor data from the smart device to create a truly
random number based on user movements collected over the course of a few seconds and
taking the resulting value as the seed for the prime number generator. In addition, higher levels
of encryption could be used, that is to say use higher bit encryption for AES and RSA, or a more
secure AES mode such as Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) in lieu of the currently used ECB mode.
This isn’t strictly necessary, but as computational resources become cheaper and easier to
come by, eventually current day best-practice encryption will have to be improved.
Currently, there is unencrypted data on the server that contains fake patient sensor
data, which should be considered EHR. This data is sent to the server in an encrypted and
secure manner. To truly be HIPAA-compliant, that data should be stored in an encrypted
manner, and certainly not in a human readable text document.
Not really related to encryption specifically, but the server where all of the information
is stored could use some hardening, as could the installation of OpenEMR. OpenEMR is fairly
robust against threats, but there are documents on specifically how to harden it. Since this was
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a proof-of-concept and not a production server, less care was taken in its set up than would be
warranted otherwise.

Access Control
OpenEMR has wonderful levels of access control built into it. However more finegrained access levels could be developed. In addition, some of the access control roles may be
superfluous. For example, if the system were going to be used for a research study, then it
would most likely be unnecessary to have an access role for an accountant. However, new roles
may need to be created for different levels of researchers.

General
While the current implementation is functional there are some flaws in its design.
Namely, the method for assigning a password to a user is not well implemented. A user’s
password for the mobile to cloud server communication is different than the user’s web login
to OpenEMR. There is no easy way to have those passwords be the same as it would require
users of the web portal to memorize a septet of, potentially, three digit numbers. This is
outside the ability of most people. In addition, the mobile to cloud server password is stored as
a plaintext value in the user’s information page. This means it is also stored in the MySQL
database that OpenEMR uses in plaintext as well. This drastically needs to be revamped, but
currently no potential methods have been identified.
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